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Horror, Ecstasy, God: In Memoriam, John Updike 
By Richard Colledge 
St. Paul’s Theological College, Brisbane 
ABSTRACT 
This paper looks to examine the closely connected themes of God’s 
existence, suffering and the goodness of the world in the work of 
American novelist, short-story writer, essayist and poet, John Updike, who 
died earlier this year. The text that structures the discussion is the syllogism 
he sets out in his semi-autobiographical work, Self-consciousness, which 
captures the thematic core of so much of his thought on these themes: viz, 
“If God does not exist, the world is a horror show; but the world is not a 
horror-show; therefore, God exists”. The discussion interweaves Updike 
with a various other conversation partners, in particular the late cultural 
anthropologist, Ernest Becker, and contemporary philosopher, William 
Desmond.  
******* 
When American novelist, short-story writer and poet John Updike died 
earlier this year, the Anglophone literary world lost an incisive social analyst 
and one of its most poetic voices on the human condition. However, 
Updike’s subtle contributions around religious themes remain one of the 
most enduring features of his vast corpus. Of particular interest in this 
respect, are the many ways he speaks to what William Desmond has 
referred to as the “traces” or “intimations of transcendence”1 which he 
reads off both the intricate beauty and brutality of the natural world and 
the turbulent depths of human interiority, rent as it is among powerful 
impulses both carnal and spiritual.    
In what follows, I wish to examine, in dialogue with several others, this 
theme in Updike’s thought, and to do so through an exploration of the 
tightly compressed but suggestive syllogistic framework he provides in his 
memoirs, Self-consciousness:  
If God does not exist, the world is a horror-show 
But the world is not a horror-show 
Therefore, God exists2 

1 See, e.g., William Desmond. Ethics and the Between. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001, 
220; and Perplexity and Ultimacy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, 227. 
2 John Updike. Self-consciousness. New York: Knopf, 1989, 230. 
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Updike’s use of such a “logical formulation” is not, it seems to me, to be 
read as a serious philosophical argument in any narrow technical sense. 
Rather, form aside, its textual function seems ironically closer in some 
senses to a rhetorical flourish; it is, after all, recounted as his “adolescent” 
solution to the equally superficial univocity of the “airtight case for 
atheism” he confronted at the time.3 In this way, Updike is largely pointing 
beyond the whole tradition of rational arguments for God’s existence and 
of philosophical theodicy, even in mimicking them here.4 Having said that, 
it is in some form clearly still an argument he wishes to defend, at least in 
terms of its central intuitions, and this he does not just in Self-
consciousness, but throughout his vast oeuvre. Indeed, it is perhaps not too 
long a bow to view these three lines as encapsulating the thematic marrow 
of so much of his writing: viz, the existential and religious tumult of so 
many of his characters, alongside an abiding sense of the primal goodness 
of life, despite everything.   
Of course, what underpins the noontime certainty of this flawless modus 
tolens logic are two hardly self-evident premises whose claims to truth are 
essentially rooted in an interpretation of the dynamics afoot in the dim 
recesses of the human soul. In what follows, then, I trace something of 
Updike’s vision of the human lot as a way of illuminating the implicit 
underlying convictions to which his syllogism alludes. I do so in 
conversation with several others, in particular the late cultural 
anthropologist, Ernest Becker, and contemporary philosopher, William 
Desmond, both of whom have written with great incisiveness on these 
matters. As such, the following is intended not as a ‘tribute’ to Updike per 
se, either as a human being or as a writer; many such pieces have emerged 
in the months since his passing written by those far more qualified, by 
scholarship and/or personal acquaintance, than I. My purpose here is rather 
to engage – as a fellow traveller – with Updike’s body of thought, 
sympathetically, but not uncritically. If the result provides a level of 
illumination of some of the matters central to his thought, then this is 
perhaps as worthy a tribute as I can offer.  
 

3 Self-consciousness, 229. 
4 In unfolding his case for God’s existence on the basis of the ultimate goodness of the world, Updike is 
clearly nonetheless uninterested in developing anything like a traditional theodicy that offers a privileged 
perspective (far less, a ‘metric’) for comparing evil against grace, the horrors against the joys, 
demonstrating the triumph of the latter. What he does provide is a richly textured description of the 
whole of life in all its deep ambiguity, with the only evaluative perspective offered being his own 
experience that it does not feel as though horror has the last word; that in his reading there is an over-
riding goodness to the whole that indicates hope is justified. The question of whether theodicy can ever 
actually do more than this is a question for another time. 
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Ambiguity and Drivenness: The Human Lot         
Central to Updike’s conception of personhood is an absolute insistence on 
its ambiguous and dialectical nature: to be human is “to be in a situation 
of tension”.5 In the tradition of Pascal, Kierkegaard and their kin (whom he 
read avidly in his youth), Updike sees the individual as unavoidably beset 
with an existentially-rooted anxiety that thrusts the soul into an unremitting 
restlessness and an insatiable drivenness. We are a tangled mess of 
energies, experiencing the pleasures and pains engendered by our 
embodiedness, together with the fears and hopes connected with our 
(frequently distorted and perverted) desire for spiritual transcendence. 
Human existence is in a sense all about the living out of these entangled 
and conflicted energies and motivations: hence the agonies and ecstasies, 
the “sound and fury”, of individual lives. Human society inevitably 
resembles Glaucon’s “fevered city” which, as William Desmond puts it, “is 
the communal embodiment of the relentless misery and hope of our 
desire” in its insatiable momentum and infinite restlessness.6 To live is to be 
on a constant quest to ‘complete’ ourselves, to address our finitude, and 
the very inevitable failure to achieve such fulfilment is the root of the 
rapacious desire and anxiety that defines human being. Thus, for Updike, 
human life is “a maddeningly turbulent and obscure mixture of laughter 
and weeping, pleasure and pain, hope and despair, tenderness and 
violence, purity and lust … faith and doubt”.7   
In a strong sense, then, Updike sits within a long tradition of existentialist 
and proto-existentialist thought according to which humanity is placed 
ambiguously between the animal and the angelic, or as Abraham Maslow 
put it, “we are simultaneously worms and gods”.8 Pulled in these 
irreconcilable directions, inevitable conflict ensues. While stopping short of 
a Sartrian conclusion that would see the human as a “useless passion”,9 
Updike is close to a post-Freudian view that sees human individuals as open 
to experience in a unique way. According to Ernest Becker, for example:  

5 James Plath, ed. Conversations with John Updike. Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1994, 34. 
6 William Desmond. Philosophy and its Others: Ways of Being and Mind. Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1990, 171. See Plato’s Republic, 372a ff.  
7 James Yerkes. “As Good as it Gets: The Religious Consciousness in John Updike’s Literary Vision”, in 
Yerkes, ed. John Updike and Religion: The Sense of the Sacred and the Motions of Grace. Grand Rapids, 
MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1999, 10. 
8 Maslow (1963). Quoted in Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death. New York: Free Press, 1973. The title of 
Updike’s novel, The Centaur (1964), notes the mismatch using this classical mythical image: “Our human 
heads endow us with a self-transcending consciousness that no earthly joy can satisfy; yet our equine 
torsos root us in mortal passions that no heavenly hope can assuage” (Ralph Wood, The Comedy of 
Redemption: Christian Faith and Cosmic Vision in Four American Novelists. Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1988, 181).  
9 Sartre, Being and Nothingness. London, Routledge, 1958, 615. 
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Nature has protected the lower animal by endowing them with 
instincts … They live in a tiny world, a sliver of reality, one 
neuro-chemical program that keeps them walking behind their 
nose and shuts out all else. But look at man … Here nature 
seems to have thrown caution to the winds … He not only 
lives in this moment, but expands his inner self to yesterday, 
his curiosity to centuries ago, his fears to five billion years from 
now when the sun will cool, his hopes to an eternity from 
now.10  
Updike concurs: “[we] have really been locked out of the animal paradise 
of unthinking natural reflex”. 11 The result, in his judgement, is both 
sublime and tragic.    
 
Horror-show: The Prospect of Godlessness 
“If God does not exist, the world is a horror show”. For Updike, it seems, 
that the thought of God’s non-existence equates to unrelieved horror, has 
a certain self-evident power. Its justification is provided not through 
rational demonstration, but in the myriad presentations and explorations of 
its truth revealed throughout his voluminous works concerning the roots 
and profundity of the human need for God and the consequent ubiquity of 
religion. While in the second premise of his syllogism Updike denies that 
the world is unrelieved horror, his works provide ample evidence of its 
horrors nonetheless.  
Famously, Updike’s work highlights the pall that the fear of death places 
over the human spirit. The fear of nothingness, of personal annihilation – 
and thus of the quest for God as a guarantor of eternal survival and 
significance – is the theme of many an Updike leading character, from the 
strangely introspective dictator, Colonel Ellelloû, who is tortured by the 
idea of his being utterly forgotten,12 to the spiritual crisis of Rev Clarence 
Wilmot who is condemned to live with the very practical consequences of 
his catastrophic loss of religious faith, as are generations of his family 
thereafter,13 to Henry Bech’s horror at the sheer perversity of knowing that 
he is simply “a fleck of dust condemned to know it is a fleck of dust”.14 
These fictional portraits give eloquent voice to the words of Unamuno, 
“spoken with the rhythms of a stubborn child”, as Updike puts it in 

10 Becker, The Denial of Death, 50-51. 
11 John Updike. Picked-Up Pieces: Essays and Criticism. New York: Knopf, 1975, 504.  
12 Updike, The Coup. New York: Knopf, 1979, 149. 
13 Updike, In the Beauty of the Lilies, New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1997. 
14 Updike, Beck: A Book. New York: Knopf, 1970, 138.  
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quoting him in Self-consciousness: “I do not want to die … I want to live 
forever and ever and ever. I want this ‘I’ to live – this poor ‘I’ that I am and 
that I feel myself to be here and now”.15  
For Updike, the thought of Godlessness leads inexorably to a crushing 
denial of the human desire for some kind of lasting significance, and this is, 
I would suggest, the deepest sense for him of the “horror-show” to which 
he refers.16 A cosmos without God is for Updike the very realisation of 
Macbeth’s vision of “a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
signifying nothing”, and each of our pathetic parts within its script is no 
more than that of the “poor player who struts and frets his hour upon the 
stage and then is heard no more”.17 In places, Updike gives voice to this 
sentiment with a full-blown cosmic vision that looks imaginatively out into 
the cold and dark recesses of space-time with a palpable sense of the 
loneliness and desolation this implies. For all its fecundity and moments of 
nurture within the phases of earthly life, nature offers no lasting 
consolation, only a ruthless and relentless efficiency that holds no value for 
human (let alone individual human) specialness. This idea is vividly set forth 
in the persona of Bela in the short story The Astronomer,18 but is most 
movingly dramatised in the figure of Ben Turnbull in Toward the End of 
Time who in a ‘Wilmotian’ moment of falling out of faith – ironically, while 
nurturing his daughter by building her a dollhouse – experiences a visceral 
realisation of his unrelieved and global vulnerability: “There was no God … 
just Nature, which would consume my life as carelessly and relentlessly as it 
would a dung-beetle corpse in a compost pile”.19  
Updike’s fictional portraits mirror what he tells us of his own personal 
musings on this theme throughout his life. He tells the story of an 
existential panic, felt as a boy, at the thought of future aeons after his 
death, of “the cosmic party going on without [him]”, and of his foreboding 
at the sight of old photographs that capture the now long-dead when they 
were in the full blush of life.20 Like skulls speaking from a monastic ossuary, 
these figures tell the truth: ‘As I once was, so you are now, and as I am 

15 Updike, Self-consciousness, 229. 
16 This is, of course, a contentious point, both as an interpretation of Updike himself, as well as a claim 
about the nature of evil. On the relationship between existential and theological anxiety and horrendous 
suffering, see below. 
17 See Shakespeare’s Macbeth, V, 5, l.24 ff. 
18 John Updike, “The Astronomer”, in Pigeon Feathers and Other Stories. Penguin, 1965, 124ff.   
19 Updike, Toward the End of Time. New York: Knopf, 1997, 83. 
20 Updike, Self-consciousness, 217 and 201 respectively. See also earlier (40) where Updike ponders over 
the “[b]illions of consciousnesses silt history full, and every one of them the centre of the universe”, each 
one a ‘somebody’ with their own cherished inner lives. His point is clear: what is the significance of 
having lived at all, if it is to be all lost after such a brief sojourn? “What can we do in the face of this 
unspeakable truth”, he asks, “but scream or take refuge in God?”.   
Ethics Education Volume 15, No 1 2009 
 
47

now, so you shall be’. What is at stake here is the irrecoverable loss of 
one’s self, in all its uniqueness and unrepeatability.  
For Becker, what such moments of realisation of one’s radical finitude 
signify – i.e., moments in which one’s morality is not simply acknowledged, 
but is felt in one’s bones – is a telling failure of the egological defence 
mechanisms by which this realisation is routinely denied. It is only in this 
state of open vulnerability that one is enabled to ‘mourn’ oneself. It is only 
then that the tragedy of death, as a loss of the self, can be faced, along 
with fundamental questions concerning the apparent futility of a life 
destined to end in annihilation. The problem is not simply the loss of the 
self, but the self-conscious knowledge of the inevitability of this loss: 
What does it mean to be a self-conscious animal? The idea is 
ludicrous, if it is not monstrous. It means to know that one is 
food for worms. This is the terror: to have emerged from 
nothing, to have a name, consciousness of self, deep inner 
feelings, an excruciating inner yearning for life and self-
expression and with all this yet to die. It seems like a hoax, 
which is why one type of cultural man rebels openly against 
the idea of God. What kind of deity would create such a 
complex and fancy worm food? Cynical deities, said the 
Greeks, who use man’s torments for their own amusement.21 
It is on this basis that Becker offers this haunting Updikean lament: 
A person spends years coming into his own, developing his 
talents, his unique gifts, perfecting his discriminations about 
the world, sharpening his appetite, learning to bear the 
disappointments of life, becoming mature, seasoned – finally a 
unique creature in nature, standing with some dignity and 
nobility and transcending the animal condition; no longer 
driven, no longer a complete reflex, not stamped out of any 
mould. And then the real tragedy … that it takes sixty years of 
incredible suffering and effort to make such an individual, and 
then he is good only for dying. This paradox is not lost on the 
person himself – least of all himself – he feels agonizingly 
unique and yet he knows that this doesn't make any difference 
as far as the ultimates are concerned. He has to go the way of 
the grasshopper, even though it takes longer.22 

21 Becker, The Denial of Death, 87. 
22 Becker, The Denial of Death, 268-69. Cf: Updike’s “Perfection Wasted” in Collected Poems: 1953-
1993. New York: Knopf, 1995, 231. 
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Even more than this, Updike seems to suggest that the process of living 
itself involves a continual dying of selves: “That we die and leave behind 
this litter of dead, unrecoverable selves is both unbearable and the 
commonest thing in the world”.23  
A key question here, of course, is whether Updike (or indeed Becker) is 
justified in claiming or assuming that the idea of death has an inevitable 
sense of tragedy for human selves in general. It is on this point that a 
comment Updike makes in passing is perhaps more telling than he realises: 
i.e., that “[p]erhaps there are two kinds of people: those for whom 
nothingness is no problem, and those for whom it is an insuperable 
problem”.24 Though he doesn’t mention him, the ghost of William James – 
with his famous distinction between the “morbidly-minded” and “healthy-
minded” approaches to life and religion – is palpable here.25 One is left 
wondering what Updike makes of “those for whom nothingness is no 
problem”: say, the indifferent naturalistic agnostic, whose very sanguinity 
concerning such matters would seem to undermine the ‘self-evidence’ of 
his first premise. Updike’s focus, of course, is on the other kind of person – 
those for whom death is “an insuperable problem” – his own kind, and the 
kind of the vast number of his characters, whether they are aware of it yet 
or not. Perhaps for Updike (though this is only a supposition), to be 
sanguine or indifferent to such matters is merely to be as yet unwoken 
from a sleep of immediacy and thus to lack spirit, as Kierkegaard might 
have put it.26  
In any case, if the very idea of personal extinction is, for Updike, horror 
enough, then there is also the contingent circumstances of its coming. As 
John Macquarrie outlined some time ago, what might be construed as the 
‘evil’ of death is not so much its inevitability, as its apparent capriciousness, 
its arbitrariness, its failure to conform to reasonable rules of fairness or 
predictability.27 For some, death is appropriate or timely: it comes as a 
completion or release, though as often than not, death lacks any such 
sense: it can come “out of season”: cutting short a young life in full bloom; 
killing off great potential; or leaving important work begun but unfulfilled. 
It may come too late, after years of suffering, or it may take the innocent 
or virtuous and spare the guilty.  

23 Updike, Self-consciousness, 226. 
24 Self-consciousness, 228. 
25 See William James. Varieties of Religious Experience. London: Longman Green & Co, 77-162.  
26 See Søren Kierkegaard. The Concept of Anxiety. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, 43-44. 
Alternatively, to use the language of Beckerian psychodynamics, such sanguinity would indicate that the 
individual is firmly under the sway of the ubiquitous denial of death. 
27 John Macquarrie. In Search of Humanity. London: SCM, 1982, 235-36. 
Ethics Education Volume 15, No 1 2009 
 
49

Perhaps most painful of all is the suspicion – seen in the dark thoughts of 
many an Updike character from Henry Bech to Ben Turnbull and beyond – 
that the whole ‘miracle’ of human selfhood may just be a cruel 
epiphenomenal accident, at best an ironic footnote to the natural history of 
this planet. Others have noted the perversity of a situation in which the 
human person instinctually considers his/her individuality to be of the 
essence, while nature seems to have a wholly different set of priorities. The 
laws of biological evolution are orientated toward the conatus of the 
species rather than that of the human individual with its need for personal 
transcendence and symbolic selfhood. “Nature”, says Becker, “seems 
unconcerned, even viciously antagonistic to human meanings”.28 Stephen 
Jay Gould is more lacerating still:  
Nature is amoral ... It existed for eons before we arrived, didn't 
know we were coming, and doesn't give a damn about us ... 
Nature betrays no statistical preference for being either warm 
and fuzzy or ugly and disgusting. Nature just is: in all her 
complexity and diversity, in all her sublime indifference to our 
desires.29  
For Updike, then, the very thought of nothingness – that we are alone, 
insignificant and utterly ephemeral in a meaningless universe – is 
fundamentally unacceptable to the human spirit. This does not mean, of 
course, that human beings might not act as self-sufficient little gods by 
day. However, “in the dark”, when all such pretentions come to nothing, 
“the self curls … and presses” against God. What is ultimately at stake 
here is the “need for our ‘I’ to have its ‘Thou’, something other than 
ourselves yet sharing our subjectivity, something amplifying it indeed to the 
outer rim of creation”.30 As if reiterating Updike in another key – and 
thereby providing a worthy epigraph for the whole Updikean corpus of 
deeply conflicted and often tragic characters – Becker memorably 
thematises this human need for what might be called ‘cosmic agap’: 
[Man] is not just a naturally and lustily destructive animal who 
lays waste around him because he feels omnipotent and 
impregnable. Rather, he is a trembling animal who pulls the 
world down around his shoulders as he clutches for protection 

28 Becker, The Denial of Death, 120. 
29 Stephen Jay Gould. Rocks of Ages. New York: Ballantine Books, 1999, 195. 
30 Updike, Self-consciousness, 229. Whether a profound need for God can in any way be a ground for 
belief that such a God exists, is a matter taken up below. 
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and support and tries to affirm in a cowardly way his feeble 
powers.31 
There nonetheless remains a question in all of this as to whether Updike’s 
conception of the “horror” of the world is sufficiently broad and balanced; 
specifically, whether his strongly existentialist account is unsustainably 
skewed in the direction of an angst-centred, subjective, perhaps even 
‘bourgeois’ point of view which does insufficient justice to more tangible 
horrors endured by those well-accustomed to ‘real’ suffering. Such a 
critique is, I would suggest, to miss the depth and complexity of Updike’s 
confrontation with these issues. He would of course want to insist that 
those who experience the threat of existential nothingness endure a 
particularly acute form of suffering in its own right. But beyond this, 
perhaps it could be said that for him suffering directly suggests the 
threatening problem of nothingness itself. The “horror” that so oppressed 
Joseph Conrad’s Kurtz, for example, was not simply born of the ‘fact’ of 
the evils he both witnessed and perpetrated; rather there comes a point at 
which evil evokes the abyss of nothingness that makes it possible in the 
first place. There is a paradox here that Updike’s fiction highlights often: 
that nothingness is not simply a privation, but has the potential to grow 
into an over-determined presence capable of engulfing the human spirit. 
This alone seems to be able to do justice to the kind of horror and despair 
to which Conrad portrays Kurtz as succumbing as his life seeped away.32   
Further, notwithstanding the broader existential context within which he 
develops such themes, it is also the case that Updike unpacks the apparent 
“horror-show” of the world in ways that touch very directly on moral and 
natural evils in themselves. One of the principal modes within which he 
does so concerns the pain of Divine inaction in the face of horrendous 
suffering and tragedy. At times, the outlines of a prima-facie anti-theodicy 
emerge here. “I’ve never really understood theologies”, he says, “which 
would absolve God of earthquakes and typhoons, of children starving”,33 
and he places similar sentiments in the mouths of many of his most 
thoughtful characters, from Rev Thomas Marshfield who at one point reels 
off a damning litany of Divine sins,34 to the dying President Buchanan who 

31 Becker, The Denial of Death, 139. 
32 “His was an impenetrable darkness. I looked at him as you peer down at a man who is lying at the 
bottom of a precipice where the sun never shines … It was as though a veil had been rent. I saw on that 
ivory face the expression of sombre pride, of ruthless power, of craven terror – of an intense and hopeless 
despair.” (Heart of Darkness, London: J M. Dent, 1965,  163-64). 
33 Updike. Picked-Up Pieces, 504. 
34 Viz: “the pain of infants, the inexorability of disease, the wantonness of fortune, the billions of 
fossilized deaths, the helplessness of the young, the idiocy of the old, the craftsmanship of torturers, the 
authority of blunderers, the savagery of accident, the unbreathability of water, and all the other repulsive 
flecks in the face of creation” (A Month of Sundays, New York: Knopf, 1975, 38.) 
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protests that he is “not troubled by the sins of men, who are feeble; [but] 
… by the sins of God, who is mighty”.35 The Divine ‘sins’ that are 
recounted in Updike’s fiction are construed in a variety of ways. The callous 
face of nature has already been highlighted, and this gives rise to some 
extended reflections on what might be understood as ‘natural’ or ‘physical’ 
evil which God permits to flourish. But like Dostoyevsky, Updike’s most 
telling protests relate to the vast evil perpetrated by “feeble” individuals, 
and of this there is no better case than the horrendous scene in Rabbit, 
Run in which baby Rebecca drowns in the presence of her drunken mother 
Janice, with God almost palpably watching on.36     
Ecstasy: The Shining Underbase of the World 
“The world is not a horror-show”. Given the profundity of Updike’s 
documentation of worldly horrors, and of the silence of God in the face of 
it, it is at first glance somewhat surprising that he should insist as much. 
This he acknowledges, noting that: 
The second premise, of course, is the weaker; newspapers and 
biology lessons daily suggest that it is a horror show, of 
landmines and plagues and massacres and falling airplanes and 
incessant carnivorousness.37 
What is the ground, then, of the assessment Updike makes in his second 
premise? There are, I would suggest, two main points here, of which I will 
dwell especially on the second. 
First, counterbalancing worldly horror for Updike, are the supreme qualities 
of vitality, energy, volition, ambition and hope. Without these forces of 
animation, life, for him, would indeed be horrific. This force for good is 
portrayed in Updike’s fiction not only by those who live it to the full, but 
also – perhaps even more starkly – through those who lack it. And in 
almost all cases, this genuine vitality is associated with visceral belief (at 
some level) in God, from whom it is drawn. This very contrast provides the 
ground of the whole inter-generational drama of In the Beauty of the Lilies 
in which, as James Schiff points out, it is interestingly the female characters 
(Stella, Emily and Essie) whose belief allow them to live lives of hope, 
dynamism and strength, in contrast to the faithless, desperate and hollow 

35 John Updike. Buchanan Dying. New York: Knopf, 1974, 167. However, on this, see point four in the 
final section of this paper.  
36 John Updike. Rabbit, Run. New York: Knopf, 1960, 226-27.   
37 Updike, Self-consciousness, 230.  
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lives of the males (Clarence, Teddy and Clark).38 The figure of Clarence 
Wilmot is pivotal here. His life changing loss of religious belief is 
accompanied by a loss of vitality, leaving him “numb” and “hollow”: 
“Life’s sounds all rang with a curious lightness and flatness, as if a 
resonating base beneath them had been removed”.39 Echoing Nietzsche’s 
madman, Wilmot’s horizon has been sponged away, his earth unchained 
from its sun.40  
Second, even in portraying worldly horrors, Updike sees in our reaction to it 
of sombre fascination, an intimation of a deeper truth about us and our 
implicit sense of ourselves in the world: i.e., bad news is news for us 
precisely because “our general expectation is for good”. In other words, 
“an instinctive vision of health and peace underlies our horror stories”.41 
This “general expectation”, this “vision” that all is very good despite all 
evidence to the contrary is, for Updike, grounded in the “resonating base” 
itself. Thus, in support of his second premise and in negation of the first, 
he announces:  
Existence itself does not feel horrible; it feels like an ecstasy, 
rather, which we only need to be still to experience. Habit and 
accustomedness have painted over pure gold with a dull paint 
that can, however, be scratched away, to reveal the shining 
underbase. The world is good, our intuition is, confirming its 
creator’s appraisal as reported in the first chapter of Genesis.42  
Updike’s case here is rooted not in intellectual demonstration; its ‘warrant’ 
is far more visceral: life, to him, does not feel horrible. Our very dismay over 
the horrors life can bring speaks to its preciousness for us. Like the 
accentuated pangs we feel when a loved one lets us down, the very 
deliciousness of being alive is sullied by its horrors, but rarely does it break 
our instinctual love. We cling to the world of our dwelling in its elemental 
preciousness.  
In this sense, Updike seems to suggest that the religious instinct is not 
simply what psychodynamic theory would classify as a reaction formation 
against the horror of nothingness, but rather the inevitably inadequate 
attempt to affirm something of this unconditional goodness of the world. 
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38 James Schiff, “The Pocket Nothing Else will Fill: Updike’s Domestic God”. In James Yerkes, ed. John 
Updike and Religion: The Sense of the Sacred and the Motions of Grace. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans, 1999, 62.     
39 Updike, In the Beauty of the Lilies, 7. 
40 See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science. Walter Kaufmann trans, New York: Vintage, 1974, 181. 
41 Updike, Self-consciousness, 230. 
42 Updike, Self-consciousness, 230. 
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This, it seems, is central to what he holds onto of his religious upbringing: a 
fumbling affirmation of the goodness of the world, an offering that drew 
forth an equally fumbling acceptance. He puts it as follows:  
What I felt, in that basement Sunday school of Grace Lutheran 
Church in Shillington, was a clumsy attempt to extend a Yes, a 
blessing, and I accepted that blessing, offering in return only a 
nickel a week and my art, my poor little art.43  
On the basis of these humble beginnings, there are times when Updike’s 
later reflections on the goodness of the world become lyrical, almost 
hymnic, such as in the stunning conclusion to Pigeon Feathers.44 His final 
published work, the tellingly titled The Full Glass, continues the theme of 
Yes saying, even in the midst of suffering and regret. In the final lines, the 
narrator, now an old man, takes a sip of water, as if “drinking a toast to 
the visible world, his impending disappearance from it be damned”.45 
Death retains its sting precisely because life – for all its struggles and 
horrors – is experienced as good.  
The claim that human existence, for all its horrors, has a “shining 
underbase” is one that seriously confronts arguments for atheism on the 
basis of evil. This is not to say that it works as a rational ‘refutation’ of 
either the logical or evidential arguments; rather it answers by pointing 
towards an underlying goodness that, it is contended, renders the horror 
contingent rather than essential. Similarly, while taking absolutely seriously 
the howling protests of Ivan Karamazov, Updike, it would seem, would 
urge him not to return his ticket after all. Perhaps he would ask of him two 
things. First, there would perhaps be a request to dwell a while longer on 
the ordinary and yet astonishingly intricate beauty of lilies and pigeon 
feathers, and the taken-for-granted miracles of sun and rain,46 or as Ivan 
himself relates, on the “blue sky” and the “sticky little leaves” of 
springtime.47 Second, and more crucial still, perhaps he would urge that 
the final word should not be given to the sufferings of the little children 
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43 Updike, Self-consciousness, 231. 
44 John Updike, “Pigeon Feathers” in Pigeon Feathers and Other Stories. Penguin, 1965, 103. Updike 
himself suggests the reference here to his writing as hymnic: “With writing, or generally with art, we 
show the world our admiration and express out thanks that we are here … Any act of description is, to 
some extent, an act of praise … [T]he world wants describing, the world wants to be observed and 
‘hymned’ … So there’s a kind of hymning undercurrent I feel in my work”(Plath, ed, Conversations, 175, 
253). 
45 John Updike, “The Full Glass”, The New Yorker, May 26, 2008. Downloadable from: 
http://www.newyorker.com/fiction/features/2008/05/26/080526fi_fiction_updike   
46 The symbols of sun/light and rain recur as images of the Divine in Updike’s work: e.g., see the 
following from Self-consciousness: “Rain is grace; rain is the sky condescending to the earth … [bringing] 
life”(41); “To be forgiven by God … the sun’s weight on my skin always meant this to me” (68).  
47 See Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (Pt 2. 4. Ch3), Penguin, 1958, 268.  
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per se, but rather to the prior beauty, preciousness and innocence of the 
children themselves whose enormous value is the very reason why their 
sufferings are so horrific and unacceptable in the first place. This is to urge 
the mind to “be still” so that it might explicitly appreciate the basic 
goodness of the world that makes its horrors so shocking. The problem 
with Ivan’s decision (albeit a thoroughly conscientious one) to return his 
ticket, or of Silenius’ counsel that it is comprehensively best not to have 
been born at all, or otherwise to die soon,48 is that such assessments 
overlook the fact that they are each parasitic on a prior generosity – of life 
itself – to which living things instinctively cling, valuing it as the supreme 
good.  
 A number of times in the foregoing paragraph I was sure to say “perhaps” 
in that this is – it seems to me – to go somewhat beyond what Updike 
himself has to say on this matter. Nonetheless, what is found in Updike is 
an emphasis on two points that are absolutely central also for William 
Desmond, and which go to the heart of this matter: viz, the contingency, 
and the intrinsic goodness, of being. While lurking often in the subtexts of 
his fiction, these themes are discussed in a particularly explicit way in 
Updike’s commentary on his own work. For him, contingency bespeaks of 
gratuity: 
[O]ne of my independent philosophical obsessions was that 
there is a certain gratuitousness in existence at all. That is, 
however riddles [of life] are unravelled, why the void itself was 
breached remains permanently mysterious, and, in its own 
way, permanently hopeful-making.49 
This insight leads Updike to a second closely connected and just as 
revolutionary one: that having breached the “void” of nothingness, being 
has intrinsic value: “I frequently find myself saying … be grateful for 
existence; that is, ‘nothing had to be’. And that advice, I think, is religious 
advice”. This, according to Updike, is the basis of his vision of creation as 
good, and this deeply informs his practice as a writer: 
I’m trying to capture … the wonder of the real, which is very 
easy to ignore since we’re surrounded with the real day after 
day … I’m trying to convey the fact that the creation of the 
world is in some way terribly good. We love being alive.50     
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48 Nietzsche recounts “the old story” of Silenius’ granting of this counsel to King Midas in The Birth of 
Tragedy (Ch 1. 3: Penguin, 1993, 22).  
49 Plath, ed, Conversations, 100. 
50 Plath, ed, Conversations, 159. 
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There are also times when this theme of the inherent love of being comes 
to the fore in Updike’s fiction. “What bliss life is”, Ben Turnbull reflects as 
he approaches death in Toward the End of Time, and what a tragedy it is 
to feel the pangs of its immanent loss, when the time for taking it for 
granted has passed.51 When all is said and done, we cling to life, even a life 
filled with more than a fair share of suffering, because being itself – and 
our own in particular – has inherent value.  
It is here that Desmondian thought provides valuable flesh on the bones of 
Updike’s passionate assertions concerning this felt goodness of existence.52 
For Desmond, as for Updike, human beings are fundamentally in love with 
being, even if its ubiquity, richness and profusion have the effect of 
blinding us to this most self-evident of truths. And it is because we 
instinctively understand being as something good, that nothingness and 
horrendous evil, are such a threat. Albeit in a different mode, passages in 
Desmond’s works resemble Updike’s strategy of revealing what is at stake 
in very ordinary moments of life that spontaneously celebrate the 
unconditional goodness of things. There is a double movement at play 
here. On one hand, he highlights the basic conatus essendi of living things, 
this elemental desire to remain in being pointing towards a particular kind 
of love of being: viz, the love of one’s own being as good. On the other 
hand, beyond self-focus, he points to the uncomplicated rejoicing that 
accompanies the birth of a child, and subsequently, of the child’s wonder 
and delight in its discovery of the world: i.e., we delight in the child’s own 
delight with the world.53  
The key point here – and this is at the heart of Desmond’s approach to the 
issue at hand – is that there is a basic sense of the Good which is prior to 
and in excess of moral good and evil: this is the ontological goodness of 
being over nothingness.54 This means that being is an always already 
inalienable good that can never be diminished (or, for that matter, 
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51 Updike, Toward the End of Time, 299. 
52 On Desmond on this theme, see Perplexity and Ultimacy, Ch 6; Being and the Between. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1995, Ch 13; Ethics and the Between, Ch 5, 16; God and the Between, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 2008, Ch 12, 14. 
53 See Desmond. Perplexity and Ultimacy, 150. 
54 It is precisely, and only, on the basis of the complete absence of any sense of the intrinsic goodness of 
being that the argument of a book like David Benatar’s Better Never to have Been: The Harm of Coming 
into Existence (Oxford University Press, 2006) could ever be conceived. Echoing Nietzsche’s Silenius, 
Benatar argues that “coming into existence is always a serious harm”, since the pleasures one might 
experience can never outweigh the harm of actually existing (1). Without engaging here with Benatar’s at 
best eccentric notion of the alleged “asymmetry between pleasures and pains”, what is most telling 
about his argument is the very idea that the value of life could ever be reduced to such a logicist calculus. 
The issue is not so much the notion of a utilitarian approach to deciding the value of any particular life (as 
problematic as that also is), but rather its pre-emptive ruling out of any human life at all, given the 
inevitability of some level of suffering. 
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enhanced) by the actions of any existing being/s, by any particular natural 
event, or by the joys or sufferings of creatures. Rather, all of these things 
are made possible in the first place by the prior gift of being in its 
goodness. In making this claim, Desmond proposes a ‘revaluation’ of 
being, not in the Nietzschean sense of uncovering a higher good beyond 
moral good and evil, but rather in the sense of a primal good that is prior 
to and which underpins good and evil in its moral concretion. Accordingly, 
moral good and evil amount, respectively, to the acceptance or rejection of 
this primal goodness of being, and each is possible only on the basis of this 
prior goodness, which is itself the condition of possibility of any action at 
all, regardless of its moral character. In this way, all worldly horrors are 
contingent and parasitic on primal goodness in its profusion.  
All this casts a compelling light on the moral conflictedness and pathos of 
Updike’s many characters. For Desmond, while the being of any particular 
being (qua a singular concretion of the good) is in itself intrinsically and 
inalienably good, in the case of self-conscious human conatus, the way is 
open for a sliding from the “I am good” toward the “I am the good”. This 
is, for Desmond, nothing less than “the usurpation of the good”55. Or as 
he puts it elsewhere: “the power of freedom is the power to let the ‘no’ 
shut out the primal ‘yes’, closing itself in, by closing transcendence as other 
out”56. Moral evil, then, is rooted in the freedom of singular being, which 
is in turn rooted in the primal goodness of being, though it amounts to a 
shallow rootedness that draws just enough sustenance for an insistence on 
the good of the self, but which is blind to the underlying goodness of the 
whole, of which it is only a tiny part. It is difficult to conceive of a more 
comprehensive description than this of the characterological feebleness, 
and horrendous selfishness, of Updikean characters like Harry (‘Rabbit’) 
Angstrom.  
Notwithstanding its many horrors, the world is not, for Updike, an 
unredeemable horror-show; the “pure gold … shining underbase” of the 
world in its primal goodness is evident, at least for those with eyes to 
perceive it.        
 
Hope: The Religious Response 
“Therefore, God exists.”A great deal has already been written on the topic 
of Updike’s attitudes toward religion per se. In what follows, I make just a 
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55 Desmond, Being and the Between, 516. 
56 Desmond, Perplexity and Ultimacy, 231. 
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six brief points in which I describe rather than explore his explicitly religious 
conclusions.  
First, Updike is very clear that religious belief is never a ticket out of the 
ambiguity and drivenness of the human condition, nor of its seemingly 
inevitable horrors. Following Kierkegaard’s lead, faith is for him simply 
(though it is anything but a ‘simple’ matter) a considered response to this 
situation, one that chooses faith over despair. As Updike relates his own 
story, the syllogism that has formed the subject of this paper was part of 
his own adolescent decision to believe despite the vacuousness of the 
‘culturalised’ faith he observed around him.57 In making such a decision, 
everything changes even as nothing changes. Yerkes captures Updike’s 
position on this when he notes that “nirvanic quietude” is out of the 
question here. Rather:   
To be religious is necessarily to exist inextricably inside of such 
excruciating tensions, spared nothing … And yet, to be 
religious is also to be seized and energised day by day, 
strangely, at some deep and intuited level, by something that 
answers to hope.58    
Even from a faith perspective, nature retains its deep ambiguity. Indeed, 
there is perhaps no more deeply equivocal category in all of Updike’s works 
than nature itself: nature as a presence both nurturing and salvific and 
ominous and vicious. The difference between the two is only ever partly 
mediated by religious faith.59 
Second, given Updike’s emphasis on the problem of death as being, as 
William James put it, “the worm at the core” of the self’s pretentions to 
happiness,60 and the prime mover towards the asking of what are 
eventually religious questions, it is clear that for him the answer to these 
questions is nothing less than eternal life. Whatever one may think about 
his insistence on this point, it is clear that there is a completely organic link 
between his notion of the goodness of existence and his hope for an 
afterlife. This is because, he argues, it is rooted not in simple self-insistence, 
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57 Updike, Self-consciousness, 230. 
58 Yerkes, “As Good as it Gets”, 14-15. 
59 The juxtaposition of nature’s transcendent beauty with its unforgiving brutality – and that both are 
equally a feature of life on this planet – is perhaps what moves Ralph Wood to suggest extra-Christian 
roots of Updike’s vision. For him, Updike “shares the Greek tragic conviction that the world’s vitality is at 
war with its order, destroying itself even as it creates and renews”. Yet, for Wood, Updike sees this not as 
an ultimately futile process that justifies nihilism, but as something that rightly still engenders hope: “The 
world is more creative than destructive, and thus more worthy of gratitude than accusation” (Wood, The 
Comedy of Redemption, 204).   
60 James, Varieties of Religious Experience. 138. 
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but in “love and praise for the world that we are privileged … to witness 
and experience”.61 This is, after all, the lingering theme of the final 
sentence of Pigeon Feathers which strongly recalls the reassurances of the 
Sermon on the Mount concerning human worth vis-à-vis the lilies and the 
birds.62 Further, there is a strong sense in which for Updike hope in eternal 
life for the self indicates a decision to embrace the idea that – despite all 
evidence to the contrary – the nurturing aspect of nature prevails over its 
viciousness; that nothingness is not the final fate of subjectivity; that “the 
universe has a personal structure” after all.63  
Third, since for Updike belief in God means being energised by hope, then 
such belief is closely related to the value of work. It is because life is 
experienced as meaningful, that work – as an expression of the self’s 
passion and confidence – makes sense. More pragmatically put, 
“[r]eligion”, says Updike, “enables us to ignore nothingness and get on 
with the jobs of life”.64   
Fourth, there is a strongly Kierkegaardian and Barthian sense to Updike’s 
emphasis on God’s hiddenness. The novel Roger’s Version is a strong 
statement of this position. Here Dale Kohler tries in vain to find God in the 
complex algorithms and swirling images generated by his computer 
programs. As if speaking on Updike’s own behalf, Roger Lambert’s 
response is to mock all such “Tower[s] of Babel”. For him, the human 
yearning for God is ultimately “our only evidence of His existence”, for we 
are always – by nature – in motion toward “the God Who flees, the Deus 
Absconditus”65 This very idea of our being drawn towards a withdrawing 
God is, it seems, perhaps the closest Updike ever gets to offering a 
substantial theodicy of sorts. Here the emphasis is on God’s silence as the 
ground of human freedom: “A loud and evident God would be a bully, an 
insecure tyrant, an all-crushing datum instead of, as he is, a bottomless 
encouragement to our faltering and frightened being”.66 
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61 Updike, Self-consciousness, 217. 
62 See Updike, “Pigeon Feathers”, 103. 
63 Updike, Self-consciousness, 227. 
64 Updike, Self-consciousness, 228. Becker arrives at a similar conclusion. Like Updike, Becker builds on 
the thought of Kierkegaard and Tillich, thus seeing faith as a response of hope to the anxiety the self 
experiences when it frankly faces the threat of nothingness: “Man must reach out for support to a 
dream, a metaphysic of hope that sustains him and makes his life worthwhile … One goes through [the 
school of anxiety] to arrive at faith, the faith that one's very creatureliness has some meaning to a creator 
... Man breaks through the bounds of merely cultural heroism ... and by doing so he opens himself up to 
infinity ... His daily life, then, becomes truly a duty of cosmic proportions, and his courage to face the 
anxiety of meaninglessness becomes a true cosmic heroism (Becker, The Denial of Death, 275, 91, 279).  
65 John Updike, Roger’s Version. New York: Knopf, 1986, 246, 67, 219. 
66 Updike, Self-consciousness, 229. 
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Fifth, in this light, a great many of Updike’s tales can be read in terms of 
the grave consequences of people self-defeatingly turning to what 
Desmond might call “counterfeit doubles” of religion, and while there are 
numerous other examples (nationalism, money, power and influence, 
fame, etc), erotic sublimation plays a prominent role in his fiction, none 
more so than in Couples whose pages are drenched in existential and 
proto-religious anxiety. As Ralph Wood has pointed out, like Kierkegaard’s 
Don Juan, many of Updike’s characters are on a self-frustrating mission to 
“search for infinity within the world of sex”.67 There is clearly an 
Augustinian tenor to Updikean thought in this respect: of the soul’s 
insatiable restlessness for God, and the self-defeating nature of any 
substitutes; of the self’s full ‘at-home-ness’ in God alone.68  
Finally, there is a strong tension in Updike’s religious vision between the 
consolations of religious belief and its obligations. On one hand, it is true 
that Updike insists on the integral connections between the two, such that 
the flourishing of the energised self is continuous with its moral life. But 
there is also an at times uneasy relationship with moral obligation not only 
in the lives of his fictional characters, but also in his reflections on his own 
life in this respect. Updike as been criticised by many for underselling the 
centrality of morality, and this charge is clearly something he is aware of in 
Self-consciousness where he admits to being “trouble[d]” by what seems 
even to him the “pragmatic undercurrent” of his text. “It is not enough, 
surely”, he opines, “to strive for faith because it makes us more effective 
and holds off terror”.69 Yet in the same work, in his “letter” to his 
grandsons, he emphasises the supreme “obligation to our own selves … to 
live”, an obligation to “nurture” the self and to defend it “against the 
claims even of virtue”. His mother’s advice resounds here: “You carry your 
own hide to market”;70 but so too does the seminal influence of 
Kierkegaard for whom we are called to ‘become a self’ by moving beyond 
a ‘merely’ ethical mode of existence.   
***** 
Ultimately, it seems to me that the circle from anxiety, to horror, to ecstasy, 
to faith, to morality – and thus, the whole itinerary of this paper – is closed 
with an extraordinary passage in Self-consciousness in which, through the 

67 Wood, The Comedy of Redemption, 180. 
68 Again, the same point is emphasised by Becker, who further comes at this issue from the perspective of 
the psychodynamics of transference: “Religion answers directly to the problem of transference by 
expanding awe and terror to the universe where they belong ... [All] the religious geniuses of history have 
argued that [we should] ... be submissive to the highest power, the ‘true’ infinity and absolute – and not 
to any human substitutes” (Becker, The Denial of Death, 202, 251). 
69 Updike, Self-consciousness, 233. 
70 Updike, Self-consciousness, 211. 
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use of a stunning analogy, the power and function of religious belief for 
the “trembling animal who pulls the world down around his shoulders”, as 
Becker so aptly put it, is beautifully sketched:   
Wherever there is a self … the idea of God will arise. Religion, 
once the self has taken its hook, preaches selflessness. The self 
is the focus of anxiety; attention to others, self-forgetfulness, 
and living like the lilies are urged, to relieve the anxiety. 
Insomnia offers a paradigm: the mind cannot fall asleep as 
long as it watches itself. At the first observed lurch into 
nonsensical thought, we snap awake in eager anticipation, 
greedy to be asleep. Only when the mind moves unwatched 
and becomes absorbed in images that tug it as it were to one 
side does self-consciousness dissolve and sleep with its healing, 
brilliantly detailed fictions pour in upon the jittery spirit. Falling 
asleep is a study in trust. Likewise, religion tries to put us at 
ease in this world. Being human cannot be borne alone. We 
need other presences. We need soft night noises – a mother 
speaking downstairs, a grandfather rumbling in response, cars 
swishing past on Philadelphia Avenue and their headlights 
wheeling about the room. We need the little clicks and sighs of 
a sustaining otherness. We need the gods.71
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71 Updike, Self-consciousness, 232-33. 
